Rothstein (2010) argues that groups may be harmed by research on deidentified data. He concludes that researchers are obligated to minimize group harms and demonstrate respect for a studied group t...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.3 (2003) 255-259 [Access article in PDF] Illnesses and Likenesses Richard G. T. Gipps IN THIS RESPONSE to Neil Pickering's paper I shall focus only on what he describes as the "strong objection" to the typical use of the likeness argument. The likeness argument, to recap, has it that we can decide whether conditions such as schizophrenia, depression, or alcoholism do or do not (...) deserve the designation of illness depending on whether they possess features which, if they occurred in physical conditions, would enable one to decide for or against the designation. To take an implausible example, if it were decided that it would be enough to describe a physical condition as an illness if it involves pain not caused through injury, then a psychological condition would be appropriately described as an illness just to the extent that it too involved such pain.In arguing against typical deployments of the likeness argument, Pickering finds that it is only on questionable initial descriptions of psychological conditions that such conditions appear to share the features that, in physical conditions, would be taken to be indicative of illness. That is to say, theorists who deploy the likeness argument to urge either the reality or unreality of mental illnesses typically presuppose what both we and they had all along hoped would be demonstrated in their argument. In terms of the above example, we might say that a certain psychological condition can count as an illness if it involves psychic pain. The concept of psychic pain is however (so the argument would have it) contestable; there exist other descriptions that make no reference to pain and in so doing fail to provide what a user of the likeness argument would need to substantiate the claim that a conception of the condition as an illness is more than a façon de parler.By way of arriving at this conclusion the following precondition for the applicability of the likeness argument (Pickering's "assumption" (2)) is insisted on: "That, with respect to the presence or absence of [those features of conditions which features decide whether or not the conditions are illnesses], a condition such as schizophrenia [must be] describable independently of the category it is assigned to." This can seem a quite reasonable restriction, for—it could be said—one can only win an argument if it is first allowed that there is actually something to argue about. That is, it is only if both partisans and detractors of the illness conception first accept a certain description of schizophrenia as spelling out what schizophrenia essentially involves that they can then progress to determining whether or not such a condition so described is or is not an illness.Yet, whereas this seems like a perfectly reasonable requirement, it is I believe uncertain whether it will always capture the form of the intuitions of adherents and detractors of the illness conception—or of the form of philosophical arguments more generally. To be sure, some philosophical discussions can perhaps be reconstructed as debates about the validity of certain inferences [End Page 255] from mutually understood premises (i.e., given X, does Y follow or not?). Yet if this were the case, then genuinely interesting philosophical arguments would probably be few and far between. If we are agreed as to the precise significance of our premises, and are not furthermore just making straightforward mistakes in reasoning, it is hard to see how or why we could all fail to arrive at the same conclusions.In the Philosophical Investigations paragraph 128 Wittgenstein wrote that "If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to question them, because everyone would agree to them" (Wittgenstein 1953). Now that proposition might seem on rather weak grounds, because all one has to do to actually disprove it is merely disagree with it. But presumably Wittgenstein is rather articulating his intuition that although philosophical arguments often take the form of clashes concerning what conclusions can be drawn from what premises, most of their substance comes from a prior failure to unpack the intrinsic significance... (shrink)

We welcome the proposal to use forward models to understand predictive processes in language processing. However, Pickering & Garrod (P&G) miss the opportunity to provide a strong framework for future work. Forward models need to be pursued in the context of learning. This naturally leads to questions about what prediction error these models aim to minimize.

Examining the historical development of scientific concepts is important for understanding the structured routines within which these concepts are currently used as goal-directed tools in experiments. To illustrate this claim, I will outline how the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations each draw on an older interdependent set of associations that, although nominally-discarded, continues to structure their current independent uses for pursuing discrete experimental goals. In doing so, I will highlight how three strands of literature offer mutually instructive insights for (...) understanding how the uses of our current scientific concepts contribute to experimental practices. The first strand of literature includes recent scholarship examining how the uses of scientific concepts can enable scientific practices (e.g., Boon 2012; Brigandt 2012; Feest 2010; Steinle 2012). In this context, scientific concepts have been described as tools that function in ways that contribute to empirical knowledge; contributions that extend beyond their traditionally recognized roles in mental and linguistic representation. The second strand of literature can be glimpsed within the technoscientific studies focus on non-human agency; a focus that supports an account of the disciplined routines within which concepts are used as acting in analogous ways to the routinized participation of machines in experiments (Pickering 1995). The third strand of the literature draws attention to how the functions of concepts are grounded by the set of historically-contingent experimental practices (e.g., Canguilhem 2008; Tiles 1984). Although maintaining valuable differences, the focus of these three strands of literature are mutually instructive. Together, they offer a view of the uses of concepts as taken-for-granted tools that function within networks of subterranean associations; associations that are grounded by historically contingent experimental practices that structure how they act (in concert with human and material participants) within the temporally dynamic processes of scientific practice. Through examples drawn from a comparison of the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations, I aim to demonstrate the value that the converging insights of these three strands of literature offer for studying the role of scientific concepts in experimental practices. (shrink)

Psychologist Richard Nisbett argues that fundamental aspects of critical thinking and logic are culturally conditioned. Nisbett’s claims, if correct, have substantial implications for the teaching of logic and critical thinking. In this paper I examine Nisbett’s arguments and conclude that he overstates the degree to which his empirical work justifies his theories about cultural difference. I will argue that we have good reason to be cautious about revising our pedagogy on the basis of assumptions about cultural difference, and that Nisbett’s (...) work does not provide convincing enough evidence to justify setting that caution aside. (shrink)

Problems of the history of philosophy, no matter what aspect of that science they deal with, are always very important. Today, when idealist philosophy seeks to give an exaggerated picture of the importance of the major spiritual values created by the peoples of the West, these problems are acquiring particular significance. In the postwar period, the number of works published abroad on the history of philosophy has increased sharply. The most popular of the older works are being revised and reissued. (...) A great number of writings on methodology have appeared. The influence of philosophy is spreading to other fields of knowledge and to their history. Specifically, historians of culture, science, technology and art are striving, influenced by the materialist concept of history, to shed the light of philosophy upon the problems that inevitably arise in these fields when their history is studied, but which cannot be resolved by the cognitive resources of the special sciences. This circumstance renders problems of the methodology of the history of philosophy particularly important and places greater responsibility upon researchers in this field. (shrink)

The great achievement of mankind was the appearance of a printed book that not only significantly expanded the circle of readers, but also in comparison with the handwritten book contributed to the unification of canonical texts, in particular, such as Scripture, church service books, works of the Church Fathers, polemical and other religious literature. Consideration of the words "Japanese typography as the basis for the preservation and transmission of sources of Christian literary culture requires a brief description of the essence (...) of printing, not only as a means of mechanical reproduction of the text, but also a remarkable cultural-historical phenomenon. (shrink)

The study of the formation of the literary culture of the words of the "peoples of the nations" is impossible without analyzing the role of libraries of monasteries and cathedrals as centers of documentary memory of the Christian past. After all, the library, as a social institution, has always played an important role in the development of education, science, culture, and religious thought on a long path to its development.

While ante rem structuralism offers a promising account of mathematical truth and mathematical ontology, several of the most prominent formulations of the view seem to be subject to significant difficulties involving the identity conditions of the objects they posit. In this paper I argue that those difficulties can be overcome by adopting encoding structuralism, a version of realism about mathematical objects developed by Bernard Linsky, Uri Nodelman and Edward Zalta.

At all times, the book was understood not only as a means of preserving and transforming knowledge, but also as a means of knowing the world around us. At the same time, from ancient times it was a subject of knowledge. Gradually its theoretical phenomenon was formed. The book essentially is the most important form of consolidation and transfer of information in space and time. From the point of view of the theory of communication, the book serves as one of (...) the forms of existence and dissemination of semantic information, a means of organizing the work of individual consciousness into a sign system for the perception of its social consciousness. After all, the evolution of the book is inextricably linked with the history of mankind. She is the foundation on which the culture of peoples is built. It helps society to grow and improve, borrow and use all the mass of knowledge accumulated by mankind. The book is the most complete and comprehensive expression of the spiritual culture of mankind, since its origin and development are inextricably linked with it. (shrink)

I. Wesen und entwicklung des humanitätsgedankens.--II. Der socialismus.--III. Der individualismus.--IV. Der utilitarianismus.--V. Der pessimismus.--VI. Der evolutionismus.--VII. Der positivismus.--VIII. Nietzsches uebermensch.--IX. Die hauptgrundsätze einer modernen humanitätsethik.

Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science” by Stuart A. Umpleby. Upshot: The process of writing a discussion case study requires that a researcher become embedded in the domain being studied; it entails constructing a reality as it is perceived by the participants; it demands a high level of humility, since complex environments have a tendency to thwart rational reasoning processes. Unfortunately, these very characteristics lead conventional researchers to disparage case writing, even questioning (...) whether it warrants the label of “research.” The propositions of second-order cybernetics offer a glimmer of hope to those of us who continue to write cases, as they inform us that what we are doing is science, just a different flavor of science. (shrink)